Sponsored By:
The Barbara Delano Foundation
The Homeland Foundation
The David & Lucile Packard Foundation
The AVINA Foundation

Presented By:
WildAid
Hawaii Audubon Society
Pacific Fisheries Coalition

Gary C. Matlock

Office of Sustainable Fisheries
National Marine Fisheries
1315 East West Highway
Silver Spring, Md. 20910
Email: [email protected]

Abstract

Sharks, like man, are apex predators that have been a part of our landscape for over 400 million years, and they can afford us the opportunity to learn volumes about existing within the marine ecosystem. Unfortunately, we seem to choose not to avail ourselves of the lessons these fish offer. We continue to ignore even the simplest of facts about sharks-that their life history strategies make them especially susceptible to over-exploitation and impede recovery of depleted populations-and are intent on repeating the all too familiar sequence of "boom and bust" events in managing marine fisheries. The available data indicate that sharks are already overfished or are threatened by overexploitation in many parts of the world. Further, there are very few controls in place to prevent those species not currently overfished from becoming so, even though we have seen what the economic incentives provided by international trade in shark products have produced. The inevitable question then is "Why is this the case?" This presentation will attempt to provide an answer that will set the stage for further discussion at the conference.

Perhaps the greatest teacher is time, and the worst student is man. There is probably no better evidence of this conclusion than the development and demise of shark fisheries worldwide. Intensive fisheries are not sustainable; initial exploitation is followed by, at best, a rapid decline in catch rates or, at worst, by a complete collapse of the fishery (Castro et al. 1999). Sharks have been a part of our landscape for over 400 million years, and they can afford us the opportunity to learn volumes about existing within the marine ecosystem. Sharks, like man, are apex predators that depend on the sustainability of their prey. In the absence of man and the presence of suitable habitat, they appear capable of maintaining a balance between their predation and the capacity of their victims to replace their losses. Unfortunately, we seem to choose not to avail ourselves of the lessons these fish offer. We continue to ignore even the simplest of facts about sharks-that their life history strategies make them especially susceptible to over-exploitation and impede recovery of depleted populations (Camhi et al. 1998)-- and are intent on repeating the all too familiar sequence of "boom and bust" events in managing marine fisheries. A recent evaluation of the status of shark species throughout the world led Castro et al. (1999) to conclude the "available data indicate that sharks are very vulnerable and are threatened by overexploitation in many parts of the world." It is worth noting that the only reported extinction of a marine population by fishing is of another cartilaginous fish, the 'common' skate (Raia batis), from the Irish Sea where juveniles were caught as a bycatch (Brander 1981). These fish do not reach sexual maturity until age 11. Further, there are very few controls in place to prevent those species not currently overfished from becoming so, even though we have seen what the economic incentives provided by international trade in shark products have produced. The inevitable question then is "Why is this the case?" Hopefully my attempt to provide an answer over the next few minutes will set the stage for further discussion at this conference.

The management of marine fisheries has experienced an incredible evolution in a phenomenally short time during the past 25 years. Prior to the passage of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act in 1976, there was virtually no management primarily because the ocean was considered to be so vast and its resources so unlimited that it was incomprehensible that fishing could ever affect them beyond nature's unpredictable impacts. However, our improved scientifically based knowledge has demonstrated that the premise on which that laissez-faire management was predicated was simply incorrect. The Americanization of fleets fishing in the U.S. exclusive economic zone (EEZ) brought with it a complete replacement of foreign fishing and an uncontrolled expansion of commercial fishing effort on traditionally important species that was expanded even further by including historically underutilized species. This increased capacity soon brought with it declines in stocks that were the direct result of fishing. The response to our increased understanding of the effects of fishing has led to the imposition of almost every imaginable restriction on both the inputs and outputs in every major marine fishery in the U.S. We now restrict the times and places where fish can be caught and retained; the number of individual fish that can be retained per person or by groups of people; the types, dimension, and configurations of fishing gear, the total weight of fish that can be harvested, and even the species of fish for which retention is completely prohibited. Indeed, we have evolved from generally unregulated, open-access fisheries to the point where every major commercial marine fishery in the U.S. is now regulated, either in part or completely, by some form of limited access; a result that was inconceivable only 20 years ago. It would appear that we are learning that fishing can and is having significant impacts on marine fish. But, the response has usually been too little too late because the approach was do nothing until it could be demonstrated that a problem existed. As a result, many of our fisheries are severely overfished or overcapitalized, or both, and in need of even stricter regulation.

Action is now occurring where severe stock declines have occurred, but attempts to manage fisheries, absent such a stock decline, have fallen far short. This is not an unexpected result, given the economic reliance on unregulated fishing that open-access Americanization brought. Controls should have been in place during development, but they weren't. Now, it is extremely difficult to restrict fishing or harvest after having encouraged unlimited participation, even if the fish involved is unintentionally caught. As you may know, there are essentially no regulations concerning the international harvest of blue sharks in the Pacific Ocean. The reason for our inattention to prevention may reside, in part, in the most recent report on stock status (conducted in 1991)-"Although a comprehensive stock assessment of blue shark in the North Pacific is still lacking, no overly deviant fluctuations are obvious in the various CPUE (catch per unit effort) series. Thus, no evidence currently exists to suggest that the stock status of North Pacific blue sharks are in a critical state. Nevertheless, further research is needed to assess the true catch levels in each fishery and their impacts on the population." (Nakano 1991). The advice that fishery managers must be made aware that sharks do not support intensive fisheries, so that they can prevent the unregulated development and irrational overexploitation of shark fisheries (Castro et al. 1999) seems to have gone unheeded. In short, without a stock decline, there is no need for management. It is worth noting that at the time of this optimistic assessment, the U.S. pelagic longline fleet in Hawaii released approximately 65,481 blue sharks and kept none. Seven years later in 1998, over 91,228 blue sharks were caught by commercial longliners originating from Hawaii alone. About one-third of these blue sharks were released while over 55,400 were finned. Only 47 blue sharks were kept whole (Ito and Machado 1999). Further, these fish are not even the target of those fishermen, and most of these unintentionally caught fish are discarded dead after the fins are removed.

The typical situation which we now face involves recovering from a period of excessive harvest. The increased fishing capacity that followed led to greatly reduced harvests that must be reduced even further. The benefits of dramatically reducing fishing effort are no better exemplified than in the East coast striped bass fishery where populations have recovered from record low abundance to record high abundance in just 8 years as a result of a compete prohibition of fishing for the species. However, if we successfully reduce fishing sufficiently that the stocks can rebuild, the remaining capacity should be enough to harvest the yields that are sustainable after the transition. There will be fewer fishermen harvesting the available resources than there were just 10 years ago. If we are successful in rebuilding these fisheries, the harvests will generally be greater than they are today, but they will never be like they were during the peak of Americanization. The stocks simply can not sustain the overfishing that has occurred.

The situation is no less different throughout the rest of the globe. The world's production of fish is now recognized as having reached a peak which is not sustainable at the current levels. The management of marine fisheries is now faced with the most difficult period in our history. We must reduce the rampant overcapacity if stocks are to recover and fisheries are to be sustained (Mace 1996). The recently adopted FAO International Plan of Action for managing capacity calls upon nations to develop a national Plan of Action by the end of 2002 to address the issue. The U.S. Plan of Action is currently under development. However, the U.S. has been taking steps to bring commercial harvesting capacity more in line with resource productivity since the late 1980's (Darcy and Matlock 1999). Our limited entry programs have been less than successful because they typically limit the number of participants to those that are involved in the fishery at the time the program is implemented, and they are imposed usually after the horse is already out of the barn. So, we are now faced with the arduous task of reducing the number of units. But even that will not be sufficient to correct over fishing and overcapitalization because the remaining units will find ways to increase their efficiency which will require even more restriction on those innovations unless we begin to manage outputs per individual instead of relying primarily on input controls. The job is not yet complete for commercial fisheries, and in fact, has only now begun in recreational fisheries. The for-hire or charter boat segment in the southeast U.S. has begun considering seriously the implementation of limited access.

The first decade of the Twenty-first Century is bringing with it the most significant changes in marine fisheries since active management began in the 1970's. How we manage those changes will depend substantially on how we meet the scientific challenges we now face. For example, it may be necessary to prohibit the harvest of a particular fish stock in the absence of an adequate stock assessment because the precautionary approach demands, as a first priority, PREVENTING overfishing instead of REACTING to it. It is precise stock assessments done within an ecosystem context, then, that are the basis for allowing any fishing mortality and for determining the maximum permissible level. We are expected to rebuild most overfished stocks in the U.S. within the next 10 years because the law requires it when the biology permits it, and in many cases it does. However, in cases when rebuilding could occur in less than 10 years biologically, the period can be adjusted up to 10 years by considering the social and economic impacts of reduced harvests during the rebuilding period. If the biology does not accommodate rebuilding in less than 10 years even in the absence of fishing mortality, then the rebuilding period is to be AS SHORT AS POSSIBLE within the biological constraints. Further, it is precise scientific economic and social information incorporated into the assessments that will determine how, when, where, by whom, and for what the maximum allowable harvest is to occur. Therefore, the foundation for effective change management is sound, applicable scientific information.

The need for the best science possible has never been greater!! Without the requisite science, managers will make decisions. These decisions will need to be consistent with the internationally and domestically accepted precautionary approach to fisheries, and they will typically cost society. In the absence of scientific information or in the face of uncertainty, total allowable catches (i.e., quotas) will have to be set much lower than would otherwise be the case to avoid potential harm to fishery stocks. It would also be difficult to match harvesting capacity to quotas without sufficient understanding of the sociological and economic impacts. The only way to avoid these costs is to improve the scientific information. The costs of obtaining the necessary scientific information will be much lower than the costs of foregoing the MSY required under the precautionary approach. Remember, managers will have to make decisions even in the absence of this information, and the impacts on fishing communities should be minimized to the extent possible.

The world's shark fisheries afford us the opportunity to learn from the past, and there is hope that we will act before it is too late. They face all of the problems identified above, and more. The rising international demand for shark products, such as meat, fins, and cartilage in the 1980s have changed these fisheries. They were historically a minor and relatively low value resource, but have recently become termed the "salvation" fisheries resources of the 1990s in the face of worldwide fisheries production decline (Rose 1998). It is very likely that the high demand for shark products will continue into the foreseeable future. There are, therefore, three alternatives available to respond to this demand: manage the supply in a sustainable way; eliminate the supply by prohibiting the sale of sharks; or provide a substitute product for sharks. I believe that the long-term demand for shark products will be met only through the first alternative--the supply is managed within the resource's level of maximum sustainable production.

The wide-ranging distribution of sharks, including on the high seas, and the international trade in sharks and shark products make it increasingly important to have international cooperation and coordination of shark management plans (FAO 1999). While there are currently few international management mechanisms effectively addressing the capture of sharks, the United Nations FAO recently recognized that the prevailing view is that it is necessary to better manage directed shark catches and certain multispecies fisheries in which sharks constitute a significant bycatch; in some cases the need for management may be urgent. FAO subsequently adopted an International Plan of Action for Conservation and Management of Sharks (FAO 1999). Its objective is to ensure the conservation and management of sharks and their long-term sustainable use through the implementation of three guiding principles, namely:

• Countries that contribute to fishing mortality on a species or stock should participate in its management;
• Total fishing mortality for each stock should be kept within sustainable levels by applying the precautionary approach; and
• Catches should be managed to provide a sustainable source of food, employment, and income to local communities.

The mechanism by which the objective is to be accomplished is through National Plans of Action to be developed by March 2001 by each country catching sharks either in directed or non-directed fisheries. The U.S. Plan is currently under development. But, significant steps have already been taken to reduce dramatically the harvest of sharks in the Atlantic Ocean, including prohibiting the retention of species for which the status is unknown or very uncertain. These actions have been challenged in a U.S. District Court, and the litigation is ongoing.

The problems of today's shark fisheries will not be solved through the efforts of individual countries managing independently of the rest of the world. Regional and subregional fisheries organizations and arrangements are also required (FAO 1999a). Unfortunately, the existing international infrastructure, in the form of regional management bodies, is currently inadequately equipped to provide the necessary authority to implement consistent management strategies beyond individual countries. This inadequacy could potentially be overcome, at least in part, by amending the instruments that created and upon which the bodies operate. Progress can also be made through activities like the Multilateral High Level Conference in the western and central Pacific Ocean region which is including the management of sharks in its discussions. Since many shark fisheries supply international markets, the ability to affect trade (e.g., imports/exports, transshipment at sea, and port privileges) is becoming an integral tool in the arsenal of regional bodies to accomplish sustainable fisheries objectives. Multilateral-sanctioned trade measures are becoming a more commonly used mechanism to achieve compliance with conservation and management measures or standards adopted by regional bodies. For example, the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) recommended in 1997 that its members impose Atlantic bluefin tuna import prohibitions on Panama, Honduras, and Belize for undermining the effectiveness of its recommendations. Trade measures against Panama were subsequently removed, and Panama is now a member of ICCAT. Last year, ICCAT went even further. It recommended trade sanctions be imposed against one of its member countries, Equatorial Guinea, for not complying with ICCAT's Atlantic bluefin tuna recommendations. I strongly believe that sustainable shark fisheries will be dependent upon similar types of measures, standards, and trade sanctions developed through appropriate regional management bodies. I would also point out that the use of trade to help assure compliance with internationally negotiated standards is not new; witness Codex Alimentarius. The World Health Organization and FAO have created a multilateral forum in which countries negotiate and adopt scientifically based food safety standards. Complying countries are then insulated from challenges in the World Trade Organization against trade measures they impose that are consistent with those standards.

I would like to end by specifically addressing the issue of shark finning. The U.S. government has taken the position that shark finning is wasteful and should be prohibited. FAO (1999a) has also addressed this topic and recommended to countries that their national shark plans should "minimize waste and discards from shark catches in accordance with article 7.2.2(g) of the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (for example, requiring the retention of sharks from which fins are removed." Finning has been identified as the major cause of the dismal condition of sharks in the Atlantic. It is a relatively new practice by U.S. fishermen in the Pacific. Surely we can learn SOMETHING from the past.

LITERATURE CITED

Brander,K. 1981. Disappearance of common skate, Raia batis, from Irish Sea. Nature 290:48-49.

Castro, J.I., C.M. Woodley, and R.L. Brudek. 1999. A preliminary evaluation of the status of shark species. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, FAO Fisheries Technical Paper 380, 72 pages.

FAO. 1999a. The international plan of action for the conservation and management of sharks. Rome, Italy. 6 pages.

FAO. 1999b. The international plan of action for the management of fishing capacity. Rome, Italy. 8 pages.

Mace, P.M. 1996. Developing and sustaining world fisheries resources. The state of the science and management. In D.A. Hancock, D.C. Smith, A. Grant, and J.P. Beumer (eds.). Developing and sustaining world fisheries resources: The state of science and management. Second World Fisheries Congress. Brisbane, Australia, CSIRO Publishing, Melborne, Australia. Pp.1-20.

Nakano, H. 1991. Effect of high seas driftnet fhsheries on blue shark stock in the North Pacific. Compendium of documents submitted to the Scientific Review of North Pacific Highseas Driftnet Fisheries, sidney, British Columbia, Canada, June 11-14, 1991.

Rose, D. 1998. Shark fisheries and trade in the Americas. TRAFFIC North America, Washington, D.C. 201 pages.